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We humans carry around in our heads rich internal
mental models that constitute our construction of the
world, and the relation of that world to us. These models
can be expressed at multiple levels of abstraction,
including beliefs about sensory stimuli and the output
of our motor programs, or higher-level beliefs about
self. Advancing our understanding of the brain’s internal
processing states, however challenging, could lead to
breakthroughs in understanding states such as dream-
ing, consciousness, and mental disorders (1). Com-
putational theories propose that internal models are
broadcast throughout the brain, including to sensory
areas of the brain (2). Techniques to read out internal
mental models will deliver insight into how our brains
use beliefs or predictions to “construct” the environ-
ment. Internal models in higher brain areas are com-
plex though, creating a paradox that they are difficult to
constrain if we want to decipher the brain’s coding of
them. However, when internal models are fed back to
sensory cortex, we assume that they are translated into
sensory predictions that would intuitively have simpler
content. In PNAS, Chong et al. (3) provide empirical ev-
idence needed to drive this theory forward. Using brain
reading, they show that the brain constructs new plausi-
ble predictions of expected sensory input, and that these
predictions can be read out in sensory cortex.
There are two information streams that coincide in
V1: the high-precision retinal input that is processed
with high spatial acuity and the broad, abstract, less-
precise strokes painted by cortical feedback. V1 is
retinotopically organized and has small classical feed-
forward receptive fields. Conversely, feedback con-
veys information about larger portions of the visual
field, giving rise to extraclassical or contextual re-
ceptive fields. By eliminating the feed-forward input
to the classical receptive field, we can investigate
internal signals carried by feedback, which originate
from diffuse brain areas (4). There are many challenges
that we need to understand, including what kind of
features are signaled in feedback. In a novel variation
of the apparent motion illusion, Chong et al. (3) used
inducer stimuli that allowed them to show that the
motion prediction fed back to V1 contained detailed
texture information. The information that they were
able to read out from V1 was created by the brain’s
prediction about an object’s rotational movement as it
moved through the visual field. But, in fact, this expe-
rience of rotation was never present in the sensory in-
put to the brain—it was fabricated by the brain out
of acquired world knowledge. A previous study used
objects rotating in depth to show a similar construction
of an unseen (but implied) object position, but only
in higher areas of the visual hierarchy (5). A number
of other studies have shown that internal processing
is contextual, both in higher (6) and lower visual areas
(7, 8). The innovation of the data of Chong et al. (3) is
in showing that internal processing is constructive and
dynamic and contains motion and feature information
even in primary visual cortex V1.
An important distinction to make is that during the
long-range apparent motion used by Chong et al. (3)
observers do not fill the intermediate space with a
perceptual illusion of the rotated object. Wertheimer
(9) extensively discussed the “visibility” of an object
on the “Bewegungsfeld” (apparent motion trace). Al-
though observers sense that the object is continuously
crossing the field, they also know that it is an illusion
and not real motion. This is an example of amodal
completion: the knowledge that a figure continues
Fig. 1. (Left) Apparent motion illusion stimulation similar to that in the experiment
of Chong et al. (3). Observers reconstructed the intermediate dynamic
representation on the apparent motion trace (dashed box, thought bubble).
(Right) Possible cortical layer distribution of feed-forward and feedback
information in the data of Chong et al. (3).
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to exist even when placed behind an occluded object (10–12) or
that motion is continued behind objects (13). The important no-
tion for the data of Chong et al. (3) is that, whereas only the gray
surface was visible, observers’ knowledge constructed the object
that was passing by (i.e., the intermediate grating). That the con-
structed grating can be read out of the activation pattern in V1
even though subjects do not actively perceive the “hidden ob-
ject” shows that visual perception and internal constructions of
visual content exist in independent neural codes. These codes
might be compared with one another as is proposed in predic-
tive coding frameworks, or they might be preserved in the sys-
tem simultaneously to allow for an internal code distinct from
an external.
In the data of Chong et al.(3), knowledge about the two objects
is used to construct a prediction of a new, rotated object, which
was never seen. However, our knowledge of the world spans
several levels of complexity. For example, we recognize objects
and can understand their interactions and their social meanings
for us. Whereas sensory predictions are more fixed because per-
ception leaves little room for ambiguity, our knowledge of the
world that forms more complex mental models has more flexibil-
ity. These models can guide how we interact with the world and
govern emotional responses. The significance of their flexibility is
that maladaptive higher-level models can be altered with psycho-
therapeutic or pharmacological intervention. In depression, un-
desirable internal models bias attention and memory toward
negative stimuli (14), leading to the abnormal processing of re-
ward and punishment, and the confirmation of maladaptive inter-
nal mental models. Deepening our understanding of how the
brain internally represents the world may then be crucial for guid-
ing treatment intervention in mental disorders.
One question that arises from the data of Chong et al. (3)
is this: What is the neural mechanism responsible for integrating
model-based feedback signals with sensory-driven feed-forward
signals? Rodent data of Larkum (15) and others suggest that this
integration might happen within individual pyramidal neurons.
Pyramidal neurons have two functionally distinct compartments
to process feedback and feed-forward inputs, in the apical tuft
and basal dendrites, respectively. These functional compartments
reside in different layers of cortex, which in turn can be studied
noninvasively in humans. For example, using high-field, high-reso-
lution functional brain imaging, it has been shown that superficial
layers of human V1 contain contextual feedback about natural
scenes (16). We can conjecture that the predicted object represen-
tation found in the data of Chong et al. (3) may also be localized to
the superficial layers that represent the nonstimulated apparent
motion trace (Fig. 1, Right). It may also be present in deep layers;
for example, while monkeys perform figure ground segregation,
feedback arrives to V1 in the superficial layers but also in layer 5
(17). It remains to be tested how feedback effects in specific layers
(superficial and/or deep) are modulated by the complexity of
the feed-forward stimulation, and by the distance from V1 that
feedback originates.
In his novel 1Q84, author Haruki Murakami (18) writes,
“What we call the present is given shape by an accumulation
of the past.” Chong et al. (3) use a simple and clever paradigm
to demonstrate that during the interpolation of motion, the
brain reconstructs object features in V1 that were never shown
to the retina. Indeed, it seems the brain can “give shape” to
its environment.
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